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Hyden: The Recovery of Attorney Fees in Texas.

THE RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES IN TEXAS
LARRY GLENN HYDEN
With the ever increasing cost of practicing law, today's lawyer is
compelled to exercise the most exacting methods available to insure
the receipt of an adequate fee. In several instances the legislature has

allowed lawyers a statutory vehicle for incorporating attorney fees into
the judgment of the court.' In recent years considerable change and

development of the law in the area of statutory grants of attorney fees
has taken place. Confusion has resulted from an abundance of misinterpreted cases and overruled authority, some of which is understandably due to the several major developments in this area. The
object of this comment is to point out some of the major pitfalls, and
hopefully, to serve as a guide to the successful inclusion of attorney
fees in a judgment.
The rule that "attorney's fees are not recoverable either in an action
in tort or a suit upon a contract unless provided by statute or by contract between the parties, ' 2 has been continuously affirmed by our
courts. 3 Although directed at different types of suits, the nature of the4
statutes awarding the recovery of the fees is essentially the same.
1 E.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1972); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 3.62
3.62-1 (1963); TF.x. PROB. CODE ANN. § 243 (1956).
2 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Texas Indem., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
8E.g., Mundy v. Knutson Constr. Co., 156 Tex. 211, 294 S.W.2d 371 (1956); Johnson v.
Universal Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 127 Tex. 435, 94 S.W.2d 1145 (1936). Contra, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391, 90 S. Ct. 616, 625, 24 L. Ed. 2d 593, 606 (1970):
While the general American rule is that attorneys' fees are not ordinarily recoverable
as costs, both the courts and Congress have developed exceptions to this rule for situations in which overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery. A
primary judge-created exception has been to award expenses where a plaintiff has
successfully maintained a suit, usually on behalf of a class, that benefits a group of
To allow the others to obtain full benefit
others in the same manner as himself ....
from the plaintiff's efforts without contributing equally to the litigation expense
would be to enrich the others unjustly at the plaintiff's expense.
Powell v. Narried, 463 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971, no writ):
However, where the natural and proximate consequence of a wrongful act has been
to involve a plaintiff in litigation with others, there may, as a general rule, be a
recovery in damages of the reasonable expenses incurred in such prior litigation,
against the author of such act, including the compensation for attorney's fees; but
such expenses must be the natural and proximate consequences of the injury complained of and must have been incurred necessarily and in good faith, and the amount
thereof must be reasonable.
See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1183 (1956); Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 469 S.W.2d 458, 461
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.):
One exception to this rule is in those cases construing wills or trust instruments.
However, even in the will or trust construction cases attorney's fees are not recoverable where the real controversy concerns . . . which of the claimants is entitled to
receive the assets of the estate.
The exceptions to the general rule are beyond the purview of this comment, which will
be confined to the recovery of attorney fees where allowed by statute.
4 See, e.g., TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1972); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. arts.
3.62 & 3.62-1 (1963); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 243 (1956).
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"[S]tatutory provisions for the recovery of attorney's fees are in derogation of the common law, are penal in nature and must be strictly
construed." 5
Another common trait of statutes awarding attorney fees is the
amount of the fee to be recovered. In determining the amount, the
statutes use the phrase, "reasonable attorney fees." 6 The precise meaning of this seemingly simple phrase, reasonable attorney fees, has been
the subject of much judicial inquiry.7 Must one prove reasonableness,"
and, if so, how does one prove reasonableness are also issues which
have been the source of much litigation.
Understanding the requirement of pleading and proving attorney
fees, and the evidence requirements to determine the reasonableness of
those fees pleaded is essential to their recovery.
REQUIREMENT OF PLEADING

In a suit seeking the recovery of reasonable attorney fees, which is a

question of fact,10 this amount must be afforded the same treatment
given to any other cause of action. The amount of the fees, which is a

5 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Texas Indem., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. Sup. 1967);
McFarland v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
6 E.g., Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1972): "[H]e may, if represented by
an attorney, also recover in addition to his claim and costs, a reasonable amount as attorney's fees." (Emphasis added.) Tix. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.62 (1963): "[S]uch company
shall be liable to pay the holder of such policy, in addition to the amount of the loss,
twelve (12%) per cent damages on the amount of such loss together with reasonable
attorney fees for the prosecution and collection of such loss." (Emphasis added.) Tax.
INS. CoDE ANN. art. 3.62-1 (1963): "[S]uch insurer shall be liable to pay the holder of
such policy, in addition to the amount of the loss, twelve percent (12%) damages on the
amount of such loss, together with reasonable attorney fees for the prosecution and collection of such loss." (Emphasis added.) Tax. PROB. CODE ANN. § 243 (1956): "[W]hether
successful or not he shall be allowed out of the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements including reasonable attorney's fees, in such proceedings." (Emphasis added.)
7 See, e.g., International Security Life Ins. Co. v. Finck, 475 S.W.2d 363, 371 (Trex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1971, writ granted). "That evidence [regarding attorney fees] consists in
the facts before the jury in relation to the services rendered, as well as the estimates of
the value given by the attorneys who testified, and is not required to show some precise
preconceived mathematicalratio to the actual recovery." (Emphasis added.)
8 See, e.g., Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Britton, 406 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
Contra, American Income Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 334 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1960, no writ); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Woodyard, 206 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1947, no writ); American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Points, 131 S.W.2d 983 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
9 See, e.g., Braswell v. Braswell, 476 S.W.2d 444, 446 (rex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ
dism'd).
[I]n deciding the reasonable value of legal services, the fact-finder may properly
consider, among other factors, the time and labor involved; the nature and complexities of the case; the amount of money or the value of the property or interest
involved, and the extent of the responsibilities assumed by the attorney; whether
other employment is lost by the attorney because of the undertaking; the benefits
resulting to the client from the services ... whether the employment is casual or for
an established or constant client.
10Johnson v. Universal Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 127 Tex. 435, 437, 94 S.W.2d 1145, 1146
(1936). Whether TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1972) changes this will be
discussed later in this comment.
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part of the general recovery sought, must be pleaded to entitle a recovery,' whereupon it enters into and becomes a separate part of the
amount sued for. 12 The recovery of attorney fees is not to be confused
with the award of "costs." The term "costs" is generally understood
to mean the fees or compensation, which are fixed by law, collectible
by the officers of the court, witnesses and other like items, and does not
ordinarily include attorney fees.' 5 The basic distinction is that attorney
fees are not ordinarily recoverable unless by virtue of contract or
statute.14 When speaking of the recovery of reasonable attorney fees,
"[a] necessary issue in controversy here, is the question whether plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fee under the statute, and if so, in what
amount; these are questions in dispute between the parties, properly
raised by the pleadings.""'
The only instances in which reasonable attorney fees are allowed
without pleading a specific amount, 6 are cases where a defendant does
not specially except to the defective pleadings.' 7 Under Rule 90,18 the
defendant's failure to specially except waives the deficiencies in the
pleadings. 19
Even though a failure to plead a specific fee may not preclude recovery of the fee, better practice would dictate the specific pleading.
The plaintiff should exercise every opportunity afforded him to amend
his pleadings to conform to the judgment 20 because, on appeal, the
specific amount pleaded will ordinarily constitute a ceiling on the
21
amount that can properly be awarded.

Once a plaintiff has properly pleaded a specific amount entitled to
11 Johnson v. Universal Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 127 Tex. 435, 437, 94 S.W.2d 1145, 1146
(1936).
12 Id. at 437, 94 S.W.2d at 1146.
13 Id. at 437, 94 S.W.2d at 1146.
14 Id. at 437, 94 S.W.2d at 1146.
15 Id. at 437, 94 S.W.2d at 1146 (emphasis added).
16 E.g., Liberty Universal Ins. Co. v. Bodiford, 426 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1968, no writ); Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Kohlenbrener, 329 S.W.2d 956 (rex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rio Grande Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Schmidt,
292 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1956, no writ); cf. Liberty Sign Co. v. Newsom,
426 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. Sup. 1968).
17 Liberty Universal Ins. Co. v. Bodiford, 426 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1968, no writ): "It being the duty of the party levying exceptions to obtain
action on them by the court, and we finding no action taken by the court, they were
waived." Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Kohlenbrener, 329 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.
-San Antonio 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); "The appellant did not except to the pleadings,
and therefore waived such defect." Rio Grande Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 292 S.W.2d
864, 869 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1956, no writ): "There was no special exception to the
allegation as too general, and testimony was adduced concerning a reasonable fee."
18 TEx. R. Civ. P. 90.
19 Id. "Every defect, omission or fault in a pleading either of form or of substance,
which is not specifically pointed out by motion or exception in writing . . . shall be
deemed to have been waived by the party seeking reversal on such account.
20 See TEx. R. Civ. P. 66 & 67.
21 liberty Sign Co. v. Newsom, 426 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. Sup. 1968).
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him as reasonable attorney fees, he is faced with the proof requirements,
that is, whether the amount pleaded is reasonable. The requirements
for the proof of reasonable attorney fees have not been readily ascertainable from the case law.
REQUIREMENTS OF PROOF

Must There Be Proof as to the Reasonableness of Attorney Fees?
Originally, the trial court could determine reasonableness without
any evidence of the nature or value of attorney's services. 22 In 1887, the
Texas Supreme Court gave trial courts this discretion in Johnston v.
Blanks23 with the following language:
But it is insisted that the court had no power to make the
allowance without hearing evidence as to the nature and value of
the services rendered. But this we think a mistake. It would certainly be competent for the court to demand evidence if it saw
proper, and in some cases this might be necessary; but it is to be
presumed that the court is sufficiently acquainted with the value of
professionalservices in preparing a garnishee's
answer which is pre24
sented to it without hearing testimony.
The law announced in Johnston prevailed until 1936.25
The supreme court, on a certified question, announced a new
position in Johnson v. Universal Life & Accident Insurance Co. 26 concerning the proof of reasonableness.
The reasonableness of attorney's fees . . . is a question of fact

to be determined and must be27supported by competent evidence

and may be submitted to a jury.

Although the court in the Johnson case had clearly decided that the
reasonableness of attorney fees must be supported by competent evidence,2 1 this precedent was not adhered to by some of the courts of
22 Johnston v. Blanks, 68 Tex. 495, 497, 4 S.W. 557, 558 (1887).
68 Tex. 495, 497, 4 S.W. 557, 558 (1887).
24 Id. at 497, 4 S.W. at 558 (emphasis added).
25 Smith v. Texas Co., 53 S.W.2d 774, 779 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved):
"It is true it has been held that a trial judge may determine an issue of fact as to what
constitutes a reasonable attorney fee for services rendered in a trial before him, from his
own knowledge of the nature and value of the services for which compensation is
claimed." Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n. v. Storey, 7 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1928), aff'd, 17 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved): "It was the
privilege of the court to hear evidence of what would be a reasonable fee for the guardian
ad litem for his services in representing the minor, but it was not incumbent upon him
to do so. . . This was a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, not
reviewable by this court, unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of this
discretion ......
26 127 Tex. 435, 94 S.W.2d 1145 (1936).
27 Id. at 437, 94 S.W.2d at 1146 (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 437, 94 S.W.2d at 1146.
23
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civil appeals. A growing number of courts of civil appeals seemed to be
ignoring the Johnson decision. 29 The language in Ferrous Products Co.
v. Gulf States Trading Co.30 illustrates the extent of this trend.
In this case trial was to the Court without a jury, so he had to
determine the facts. It was not necessary to have opinion evidence
as to a reasonable attorney's fee. The judge had all essential facts
before him as to the work done, the time spent and the nature of
the controversy. The Trial Court could take judicial notice of
what would be a reasonable attorney's fee.31
This trend of decisions by the courts of civil appeals resulted in an
emphatic reaffirmance of the Johnson decision by the Texas Supreme
Court in Great American Reserve Insurance Co. v. Britton.32
The plaintiff offered no proof of any kind of the reasonableness
of the attorney fees sought and recovered. We have held that "[t]he
reasonableness of attorney's fees . . . is a question of fact to be

determined and must be supported
by competent evidence and
33
may be submitted to a jury."
The supreme court in Britton expressly disapproved several of the
prior courts of civil appeals' decisions, as being contrary to its own
34
decision in Johnson.
There are holdings in some Court of Civil Appeals' opinions
that the reasonableness of attorney fees is not a jury question but
is a matter entrusted to the trial judge's discretion; and further,
29 See Combined Am. Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 403 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hilliard v. Home Builders Supply. Co., 399 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Akins v. Coffee, 376 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1964, writ dism'd); American Income Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 334 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, no writ); Ferrous Prods. Co. v. Gulf States Trading Co., 323
S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959), aff'd, 332 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Sup. 1960);
Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Woodyard, 206 S.W.2d 93 (rex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1947, no
writ); May v. Donalson, 141 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940, no writ);
American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Points, 131 S.W.2d 983 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939, writ
dism'd jdgmt cor.).
Some of the courts of civil appeals began differentiating between trial before a jury and
trial to the court without a jury. See, e.g., May v. Donalson, 141 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940, no writ).
It has been held that in a trial before the court, the judge can fix the attorney's
fees, even though there is no testimony from which to determine the value of the
attorneys' services . . . . But, in a trial to a jury there must be evidence of what
services the attorney had rendered, and of the reasonable value of such services, and
the jury, but not the judge, should, from this evidence, fix the amount of the fees.
30 323 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959), afj'd, 332 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Sup.
1960).
31 Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
32 406 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
33 Id. at 907 (emphasis added).
34 Id. at 907. The court voiced its disapproval of American Income Life Ins. Co. v.
Davis, 334 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, no writ); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v.
Woodyard, 206 S.W.2d 93 (rex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1947, no writ); American Nat'l Ins.
Co. v. Points, 131 S.W.2d 983 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
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that the trial judge may adjudicate reasonableness on judicial
knowledge and without the benefit of evidence. . . . Those holdings are in conflict with our own in Johnson . . . and are Vdisapproved.35
Today, in view of the Britton decision, it is clear that the reasonableness of attorney fees must be supported by competent evidence.30
Evidence of Reasonableness
A number of factors may be properly considered by the trier of the
facts in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees. Generally,
evidence to be considered consists of facts "in relation to the services
rendered, as well as the estimates of their value made by attorneys who
testified." 37 Specifically, some factors properly considered by the factfinder are:
[T]he time and labor involved; the nature and complexities of
the case; the amount of money or the value of the property or
interest involved, and the extent of the responsibilities assumed
by the attorney; whether other employment is lost by the attorney
because of the undertaking; the benefits resulting to the client
from the services; the contingency or certainty of compensation;
and whether the employment is casual or for an established or
38
constant client.

35 Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Britton, 406 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Tex. Sup. 1966) (emphasis added).
Sld, at 907. See generally Bagby, Land & Cattle Co. v. California Livestock Comm'n Co.,
439 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1971). [A]lthough the procedure in Texas courts would apparently require proof of reasonable attorney's fees, federal courts are not bound by this
procedure in diversity actions. It was entirely permissible for the district court to fix
attorney's fees on the basis of its own experience and without the aid of testimony of
witnesses."
This comment will discuss the effects of amended TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226
(Supp. 1971). "The amount prescribed in the current State Bar Minimum Fee Schedule
shall be prima facie evidence of reasonable attorney's fees. The Court, in non-jury cases,
may take judicial knowledge of such schedule and of the contents of the case file in
determining the amount of attorney's fees without the necessity of hearing further evidence." (Emphasis added.) This amendment, in effect, overrules the Britton decision
with
respect to attorney fees under article 2226.
3
7E.g., Gulf Paving Co. v. Lofstedt, 144 Tex. 17, 28, 188 S.W.2d 155, 160 (1945); International Security Life Ins. Co. v. Finck, 475 S.W.2d 363, 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1971, writ granted); Magids v. Dorman, 430 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
38 Braswell v. Braswell, 476 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ dism'd).
E.g., Republic Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Morrison, Docket No. 8106, Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana, October 24, 1972 (not yet reported): "We hold that a reasonable attorne's
fee in such cases [under article 3.61] would be at least the amount prescribed in the
current suggested State Bar Minimum Fee Schedule for the preparation and trial of a
civil case." American Exch. Life Ins. Co. v. Willis, 433 S.W.2d 945, 950 (rex. Civ. App.Tyler 1968, no writ); Hilliard v. Home Builders Supply Co., 399 S.W.2d 198, 202 (rex.
Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Wiznia v. Wilcox, 438 S.W.2d
874, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.): "In the absence of
testimony connecting the opinion evidence of the expert witness with the accuracy of the
facts he made the basis of such opinion, the evidence of said expert as to his opinion of a
reasonable fee was based on hearsay, incompetent evidence .... "
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The above enumerated considerations are in keeping with those laid
down by the Texas Bar Association. 9
Although there must be some proof of reasonableness, which may
be accomplished by any of the means previously discussed, the attorney
"is not required to show some precise preconceived mathematical
ratio to the actual recovery."40 The amount of recovery should not
detract from the reasonableness of attorney fees because there are many
cases where the actual amount of recovery has "little or nothing to do
with the amount of professional skill, time, and trouble required

.... 41

However, no recovery in the suit will preclude the award of attorney
fees.

42

Even though it is persuasive in the trial, opinion evidence or testimony as to the reasonableness of the fees, though uncontradicted, "is
not binding and conclusive on the trial court." 43 On appeal, reason-

ableness will be determined by the appellate court from the entire
record in the case, thus viewing the matter in the light of the testimony,
"own common
the record, the amount in controversy and using 4 its
4
knowledge and experience as lawyers and judges."
Proof of Reasonableness Under Article 222645
The most significant portion of article 2226 is its amendment, effective in 1971 pertaining to the determination of the reasonableness of
attorney fees:
89 Tex. Bar Ass'n, Rules and Canons of Ethics, art. XII, § 8 (DR 2-106) (B) (1972).
A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary
prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess
of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) The time and labor required, the novelty
and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
services properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
40 International Security Life Ins. Co. v. Finck, 475 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1971, writ granted) (emphasis added). See Magids v. Dorman, 430 S.W.2d 910, 912
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41 Magids v. Dorman, 430 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
42 Id. at 912.
48 International Security Life Ins. Co. v. Kamp, 462 S.W.2d 63, 67 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1970, writ dism'd); accord, e.g., Gulf Paving Co. v. Lofstedt, 144 Tex. 17, 28,
188 S.W.2d 155, 161 (1945); Harlow v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.2d
365, 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44 Capitol Life Ins. Co. v. Rutherford, 468 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[ist Dist.] 1971, no writ); accord, e.g., Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Norton, 5 S.W.2d 767
(Tex.Comm'n App. 1928, holding approved); Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Reese, 476
S.W.2d 928, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
45 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1972).
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The amount prescribed in the current State Bar Minimum Fee
schedule shall be prima facie evidence of reasonable attorney's
fees. The court, in non-jury cases, may take judicial knowledge
of such schedule and of the contents of the case file in determining
the amount of attorney's
fees without the necessity of hearing
46
further evidence.
Article 2226 awards attorney fees in suits for "services rendered,
labor done, material furnished, over charges on freight or express, lost
or damaged freight or express, or stock killed or injured or suits
founded upon a sworn account or accounts . .

.

.

"47

However, in order

to recover the fees under article 2226, the plaintiff must make a demand for his claim and if, after the expiration of 30 days, the claim
has not been satisfied, the plaintiff must obtain a judgment for any
amount of the claim. 48 At the time of this writing, three cases have
construed the amendment to article 2226. To a lawyer trying to recover
attorney fees these three cases present a dilemma. The holdings in
these cases, Duncan v. Butterowe,49 McDonald v. Newlywed's, Inc.,50
and Superior Stationers Corp. v. Berol Corp.,5' are, at best, conflicting.
Under almost identical circumstances, the Duncan case disallowed the
fees;5 2 the McDonald case allowed the fees;

53

and the Superior Sta-

tioners case allowed a portion of the fees with a suggestion of remittitur
54
for the remaining portion.
All three cases involved suits on sworn accounts, with summary
judgments rendered for the plaintiffs. Each judgment included an
award of attorney fees under article 2226. Also, each defendants'
answer failed under Rule 185.55
46 Id. (emphasis added).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49474 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ).
50 483 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, writ filed).
51 483 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, no writ).
52Duncan v. Butterowe, 474 S.W.2d 619, 621 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1971, no writ).
53 McDonald v. Newlywed's, Inc., 483 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1972, writ filed).
54 Superior Stationers Corp. v. Berol Corp., 483 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, no writ).
55 TEx. R. Civ. P. 185:
When any action or defense is founded upon an open account or other claim for
goods, wares and merchandise . . .or is for personal services rendered, or labor done
or labor or materials furnished on which a systematic record has been kept, and is
supported by the affidavit of the party . . . taken before some officer authorized to
administer oaths, to the effect that such claim is, within the knowledge of affiant,
just and true . . . the same shall be taken as prima facie evidence thereof, unless
the party resisting such claim shall ... file a written denial, under oath, stating that
each and every item is not just or true, or that some specified item or items are not
just and true .... When the opposite party fails to file such affidavit, he shall not
be permitted to deny the claim, or any item therein, as the case may be. (Emphasis
added.)
Superior Stationers Corp. v. Berol Corp., 483 S.W.2d 857, 861 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston
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The Duncan case: The court affimed the judgment as to the sworn
account, severed the award of attorney fees, and reversed and remanded.5 The trial court had awarded $1491.55 on the sworn account
plus $500 attorney fees. In disallowing the fees Duncan reiterated the
general rule that "a summary judgment should be granted only if the
summary judgment record establishes a right thereto as a matter of
law." 57 The court recognized the State Bar Minimum Fee Schedule,
which constituted prima facie evidence of reasonable attorney fees, 58
as being evidence which would suffice as proof of the facts in issue until
its effect is overcome by other evidence. 59 The court held that the
appellee did not establish his right to a $500 attorney fee as a matter
of law because "[t]he appellee neither showed it to be so nor did the
appellant have any effective means of proving his position in this
summary judgment case." 60
Under Rule 185, the defendant's failure to file a sworn denial specifically stating the unjustness of the account was taken as prima facie
evidence of the justness of the plaintiff's account, whereby the defendant was precluded from denying the claim."1 Yet, on the other hand,.
the court reversed the award of attorney fees because the prima facie
evidence constituted by the minimum fee schedule did not establish
the plaintiff's right thereto as a matter of law. 2 The court reasoned
that, since this was a summary judgment proceeding, the defendant
had no effective means of proving his position. 63 Duncan seems to be
holding that the prima facie evidence established under a Rule 185
failure will support a summary judgment, but the prima facie evidence
established under 2226 will not support a summary judgment.
The McDonald case: The court affirmed the judgment as to both the
[1st Dist.] 1972, no writ). The defendant's denial was improperly verified. McDonald v.
Newlywed's, Inc., 483 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, writ filed). The
defendant's denial was unsworn and did not set out in specific terms the unjustness of
the account. Duncan v. Butterowe, 474 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1971, no writ). The defendant's denial did not set out the unjustness of the account
in specific terms.
56Duncan v. Butterowe, 474 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1971, no writ).
57 Id. at 621; accord, Harrington v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 452 S.W.2d 423, 424
(rex. Sup. 1970).
58 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1972).
69Duncan v. Butterowe, 474 S.W.2d 619, 621 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1971, no writ).
60 Id. at 621.
61TEx. R. Civ. P. 185; accord, Duncan v. Butterowe, 474 S.W.2d 619, 620 (rex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ).
62 Duncan v. Buterowe, 474 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971,
no writ). But see Superior Stationers v. Berol Corp., 483 S.W.2d 857, 859 (rex. Civ. App.Houston [lst Dist.] 1972, no writ) where that court draws an analogy between the prima
facie evidence in Rule 185 and the prima facie evidence in article 2226. (Emphasis added.)
63 Duncan v. Butterowe, 474 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1971, no writ).
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sworn account and the award of attorney fees. 4 The trial court awarded
$248 on the sworn account plus $60 attorney fees. McDonald recognized
the prima facie evidence of attorney fees, established by the minimum
fee schedule65 as rebuttable, but stated that the defendant failed to
rebut. 6 Thus, the defendant's failure to file a sworn denial conforming
to Rule 18567 entitled the plaintiff to a summary judgment on the $60
attorney fees; (the amount was within the rate prescribed by the minimum fee schedule)., 8
In overruling the motion for rehearing, the Texarkana Court of
Civil Appeals found it necessary to reconcile its decision in McDonald
with the Duncan case.6 9 The McDonald court harmonized the two
cases with the following reasoning:
The State Bar Minimum Fee Schedule suggests that, in the collection of commercial account, a minimum fee of 33 1/3 per cent
of the amount collected is reasonable "with or without the filing
of a suit and irrespective of whether there is a trial." In the
Duncan case, [the plaintiff] sued for $1,491.65, plus an additional
sum of $500.00 as attorney fees. It is obvious that the $500.00
awarded by the trial court was in excess of 33 1/3 per cent of
$1,491.65, and therefore could not be prima facie evidence of a
reasonable attorney's fee prescribed by the current State Bar Minimum Fee Schedule. Since the $500.00 fee exceeded the State Bar
Minimum Fee Schedule, it became a fact issue as to whether or
not such amount was reasonable, to be determined on remand of
the case ....
In the case before this Court, the amount sued for was $248.00,
plus interest, attorney's fees of $60.00, and all costs. The attorney's
fee of $60.00 falls within the suggested minimum fee of 33 1/3
per cent and would therefore be prima facie evidence that such
fee was reasonable ....

70

The fees sought in Duncan exceeded the State Bar Minimum Fee
Schedule by $2.82. 71 If the McDonald interpretation of the Duncan
64 McDonald v. Newlywed's, Inc., 483 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1972, writ filed).
65 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1972).
66 McDonald v. Newlywed's, Inc., 483 S.W.2d 334, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1972, writ filed). But see TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(f); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. McBride, 159
Tex. 442, 454, 322 S.W.2d 492, 500 (1958).
67 See TEx. R. Civ. P. 185.
68 McDonald v. Newlywed's, Inc., 483 S.W.2d 334, 337 (rex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1972, writ filed); accord, State Bar Minimum Fee Schedule 12 (1968). "With or without
the filing of a suit and irrespective of whether there is a trial . . . Minimum 331/3%.
There was a judgment for $248 and attorneys fees award of $60 in McDonald.
69 McDonald v. Newlywed's, Inc., 483 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1972, writ filed).
70 Id. at 338.

71 See Duncan v. Butterowe, 474 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1971, no writ); State Bar Minimum Fee Schedule 12 (1968).
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case is correct, the sole reason for remanding the fees in Duncan was
the $2.82 excess. If so, why did the court in Duncan fail to suggest a
remittitur72 of $2.82, instead of remanding the attorney fees back to
the trial court for such a trivialsum?
The more reasonable interpretation of the Duncan case appears to
be that the court would not have allowed the fees in any amount
because the prima facie evidence established by the minimum fee
schedule did not establish the plaintiff's right to the fee as a matter of
law, thereby precluding the summary judgment on that issue. Since it
was a summary judgment case, the result that really seemed to disturb
the court in Duncan was that the defendant did not have any effective
means of rebutting the fee. 73 The Duncan case made no mention of
the specific amount involved in the minimum fee schedule or its relation to the fees sought.
The Superior Stationers case: The court affirmed the judgment of
the trial court conditioned upon the plaintiff's remitting a portion
of the attorney fees. 74 The trial court awarded $2,863.49 on the sworn
account and $900 attorney fees. In affirming a portion of the fees, the
court in Superior Stationers recognized the prima facie evidence established by the minimum fee schedule as sufficing for summary judgment
proof, in the absence of opposing evidentiary data.7 5 The prima facie
evidence provision in article 2226 was likened to the prima facie evidence provision in Rule 185.76 In reversing a portion of the fees, the
court pointed out the distinction made by the minimum fee schedule
between the percentages to be charged for contingent fees as opposed
to non-contingent fees, where a lower percentage is suggested. 7 Since
the record did not show whether the fee was to be on a contingent or
non-contingent basis, the court held that the plaintiff was only entitled
to 20 per cent of the amount involved, suggesting a remittitur of the
remainder.78 Article 2226 allows the trial judge, in non-jury cases, to

See Tax. R. Civ. P. 440. Remittiturs will be discussed at length later in this comment.
See Duncan v. Butterowe, 474 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1971, no writ).
74 Superior Stationers Corp. v. Berol Corp., 483 S.W.2d 857, 861 (rex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, no writ).
751 Id. at 859; see TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A(f).
76 Superior Stationers Corp. v. Berol Corp., 483 S.W2d 857, 860 (rex. Civ. App.Houston [ist Dist.] 1972, no writ).
77 Id. at 860; accord, State Bar Minimum Fee Schedule 12 (1968).
Contingent Fee based on the amount collected or realized:
With or without the filing of a suit and irrespective of whether there is a trial....
Minimum 33y%
72
78

If an appeal is perfected from the judgment of the trial court ...... Minimum 40%

Non-contingent Fee based on the amount involved:
With or without the filing of a suit and irrespective of whether there is a trial ....
Minimum 16%
If an appeal is perfected from the judgment of the trial court ...... Minimum 20%
78 Superior Stationers Corp. v. Berol Corp., 483 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, no writ).
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take judicial knowledge of the minimum fee schedule, as well as the
contents of the case file. Must the record show whether the fee was
contingent or non-contingent?
If the prima facie evidence established by a defendant's failure under
Rule 185 will support a summary judgment, it seems only logical that
the prima facie evidence established under article 2226 should also support a summary judgment. Both McDonald and Superior Stationers so
held, although contrary to Duncan.
The court in McDonald neither deemed it necessary for the record
to show whether the fee was contingent or non-contingent, nor to even
discuss the distinction drawn in the minimum fee schedule, contrary to
Superior Stationers. Since article 2226 allows the trial judge to take
judicial knowledge of the contents of the case file, it seems that a
factual determination made by him from the case file, as to whether or
not the fee was contingent, would have no need to appear in the record.
Obviously, the questions raised by, and the discrepancies between,
Duncan, McDonald, and Superior Stationers will have to be resolved.
Aside from summary judgments, the amendment to article 2226 leaves
a number of other issues for judicial interpretation. The first sentence
of the amendment, pertaining to the prima facie evidence established
by the minimum fee schedule, would seem to be directed to both jury
and non-jury cases. In non-jury cases, the amendment allows the trial
judge the broad discretion of taking judicial knowledge of the fee
schedule and the contents of the case file without the necessity of hearing any further evidence. How much will this affect the proof requirements formulated in Britton?79
FEES FOR APPELLATE STEPS

Cooksey v. Jordan"° in 1912 closed the doors to recovery of attorney
fees at the trial level for any subsequent, contingent appellate steps. 8'
The trial court in Cooksey awarded $150 attorney fees, and in the
event of an appeal, an additional $100 attorney fees.8 2 The supreme
79 Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Britton, 406 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
[T]he reasonableness of attorney's fees . . .is a question of fact to be determined
and must be supported by competent evidence ....
There are holdings in some Court of Civil Appeals' opinions that the reasonableness of attorney fees is not a jury question but is a matter entrusted to the trial
judge's discretion; and further, that the trial judge may adjudicate reasonableness
on judicial knowledge and without the benefit of evidence .... Those holdings are
in conflict with our own ... and are disapproved.
For a discussion of judicial knowledge, as distinguished from judicial notice, see Annot.,
113 A.L.R. 258 (1937).
80 104 Tex. 618, 143 S.W. 141 (1912).
81 Id.

82 Id. "The judgment of the trial court recites that same is 'alternative, final and not
conditional,' and further that 'the clerk of this court is directed on the request of the
said Huggins to issue execution on this judgment for One Hundred and Fifty ($150.00)
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court upheld the $150 award for the fees saying "[h]ere there is in
effect a judgment unconditional, and in no manner contingent, for
$150 . . . . 8 However, as to the additional $100 to be awarded in the
event of an appeal, the court reversed, holding that "[t]his provision of
the judgment was and is unauthorized in the manner attempted to be
4
rendered."
The Cooksey opinion, by implication, revealed the possibility of a
method to recover fees for appellate steps which would not render the
judgment invalid as conditional.8 5 A method devised to circumvent
Cooksey was to award a fee large enough to protect the prevailing
party in the event of an appeal.80 The form of these judgments87
"differs from that of the Cooksey case in that a total award is first fixed
and then a proviso is added which reduces the award by remittitur in
the absence of appellate steps."88 The distinction between these two
modes of awarding fees for appellate steps is in form only, since the
the substantive result is the same in either instance. In the past decade,
several courts of civil appeals have approved this method of circumventing the Cooksey holding. 89 In 1971, with its decision in International Security Life Insurance Co. v. Spray,9° the supreme court expressly overruled Cooksey, thereby abating the procedural obstacles
Cooksey posed to the recovery of fees for appellate services. 91 In disDollars, interest and costs, if appeal is perfected on this judgment within the manner and
time prescribed by law then said writ of execution shall be for the sum of $250.00, interest
and costs.'"
88 Id.
84 Id.
85 ld. Although this language obviously implies that there might be ways of awarding
fees for appellate steps, the court did not delve into the manner of how this might be
accomplished.
80 See International Security Life Ins. Co. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d 347, 348 (Tex. Sup.
1971).
87 An example of this type of trial court judgment reads as follows:
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the court that the plaintiff herein have and recover judgment of and from the defendant in the sum of
$1750.00 as attorney's fees, and it is the further judgment of the court that if
defendant herein does not appeal this cause, the said judgment should be credited
with $1,000.00 as attorney's fees, leaving recovery for attorney's fees herein the sum
of $750.00. It is the further judgment of the court that if the defendant appeals this
cause to the Court of Civil Appeals and said cause is not carried by appeal or writ
of error to the Supreme Court of Texas, that its judgment be credited with the sum
of $500.00 on attorney's fees, leaving recovery for attorney's fees herein in the sum
of $1250.00.
International Security Life Ins. Co.. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d 347, 348 (Tex. Sup. 1971).
88 Id. at 349.
89 See, e.g., International Security Life Ins. Co. v. Chesshir, 468 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Security Life Ins. Co. v. Executive Car Leasing
Co., 433 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Central States
Life Ins. Co. v. Byrnes, 375 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
American Bankers Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 369 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1963,
writ dism'd w.o.j.).
90 468 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Sup. 1971).
91 Id, at 350, overruling Cooksey v. Jordan, 104 Tex. 618, 143 S.W. 141 (1912).
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cussing the two methods of awarding fees for appellate services, the
court held:
[T]he trial judge may choose to allow an attorney fee large enough
to protect the prevailing party in the event of an appeal. But it is
the better practice
to allocate the fee only if the additional work
92
is actually done.
Certainty of the judgment is the goal to be achieved by the trial
judge, not the form. 93 Although a final judgment must be characterized
with definiteness and certainty, "this certainty is not dissipated simply
because the district clerk has to compute costs to add to the amount
of the judgment or to deduct a remittitur that is ordered. '9 4 A trial
court judgment awarding fees for appellate services will not be held
invalid for lacking definiteness "[s]o long as the judgment of the court
makes the figure which the clerk is to place in the writ of execution
determinable by ministerial act ....
"95
Attorneys should also look to Spray for support in requiring trial
courts to award fees for subsequent appellate steps.96
The purpose of the statute [awarding attorney fees] would be defeated if only the fees incurred in the trial court were recoverable
....No such distinction or limitation may be found ....When it
imposes liability ... for "reasonable attorney fees for the prosecution and collection of such loss," it includes all fees incurred for
97
that purpose.
If Spray is interpreted as requiring the award of appellate fees, it
should become common practice to seek the award of fees for appellate
services. However, in doing so, it must be noted that, in Texas, "the
award of any attorney fee must be by an original factual determination
in the trial court, and the court of civil appeals, in exercising its appellate jurisdiction, may not initiate the award."9' 8
An example of a frustrated attempt to recover fees for appellate services is Carter v. Leiter,99 one of the first post-Spray decisions. At the
trial level, appellee had failed to request additional attorney fees in the
event of an appeal. 100 Thus, the trial court awarded none.'1 1 On appeal,
92

Id. at 349.

93 Id. at 350.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.

at 350.
at 350.
at 349; Republic Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Morrison, Docket No. 8106, Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana, October 24, 1972 (not yet reported): "Counsel for appellees would
have been entitled to an additional fee for representing his client in this appeal if he had
so requested it in the trial court."
97 International Security Life Ins. Co. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. Sup. 1971).
98 International Security Life Ins. Co. v. Finck, 475 S.W.2d 363, 373 (rex. Civ. App.,
Amarillo 1971, writ granted).
99 476 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
100 See TEx. R. Civ. P. 301.
101 Carter v. Leiter, 476 S.W.2d 461, 463 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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appellee did not assign error 02 to the disallowance of appellate fees
because of a Rule 90 waiver.108 He merely "requested" a remand for
the purpose of allowing fees for the appeal. 10 4 There is "no authority
or
permitting' 11 5 the courts of civil appeals to grant such a
requiring 10
6
"request."' Courts of civil appeals are limited to the determination
of questions which affect the correctness of judgments rendered by the
courts below. 10 7 A court of civil appeals is not empowered "to determine a material issue of fact and render judgment thereon when such
issue has not been passed upon by the trial court."' 0 8 Therefore, fees
for appellate services should be included in the pleadings at the trial
level. 109 On appeal, a trial court denial of fees for appellate services
should be assigned as error." 0
USE

OF REMITTITURS

The procedural rules pertaining to remittiturs' can be valuable
tools in attorney fee litigation. At the trial level a remittitur may stave
off a new trial.112 At the appellate level a remittitur may convert a
reversal to an affirmance." 8 In any event, when the issue is the excessiveness of a verdict, the attorney might want to consider the advantages of
a remittitur, depending obviously upon the amount to be remitted and
the strength of the defendant's case. It must be stressed that the sole
occasion for the use of a remittitur arises when the only ground for
102 See TEx. R. Civ P. 374.
108 TEx. R. Civ. P. 90.
104 Carter v. Leiter, 476 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd).
105
106
107
108
109

Id. at 463.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 463.

Smith v. Texas Co., 53 S.W.2d 774, 779 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved).
See TEx. R. Civ. P. 301.
110 See TEx. R. Civ. P. 374.
111 See Tax. R. Civ. P. 315 (mechanics at trial level); TEx. R. Civ. P. 319 (effect upon
trial judgment); Tax. R. Civ. P. 328 (suggestion of remittitur by trial court); TEx. R.
Civ. P. 439 (remittitur to court of civil appeals before judgment); TEx. R. Civ. P. 440
(remittitur to court of civil appeals after judgment); Tax. R. Civ. P. 441 (refusal to remit
not to be alluded to in subsequent trial).
112 Tax. R. Civ. P. 328. "New trials may be granted when the damages are manifestly
too small or too large, provided that whenever the court shall direct a remittitur in any
action, and the same is made, and the party for whose benefit it is made shall appeal.
118 TEx. R. Civ. P. 440:
In civil cases appealed to a Court of Civil Appeals, if such court is of the opinion
that the verdict and judgment of the trial court is excessive and that said cause
should be reversed for that reason only, then said appellate court shall indicate to
such party, or his attorney, within what time he may file a remittitur of such excess.
If such remittitur is so filed, then the court shall reform and affirm such judgment
in accordance therewith; if not filed as indicated then the judgment shall be reversed.
For examples of the use of remittiturs at the appellate stage see Brooks v. Brooks, 480
S.W.2d 463, 466-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, no writ) and Capitol Life Ins. Co. v.
Rutherford, 468 S.W.2d 555, 537 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, no writ).
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reversal is excessiveness of the judgment according to the evidence
114
bearing upon the amount.
At the Trial Level
If a motion for new trial is based upon the ground that the verdict
for the attorney fees is excessive, the trial judge may conditionally
overrule the defendant's motion contingent upon the plaintiff remitting
the amount deemed excessive. 115 As to the determination of the amount
of the excess, "there is no rule prescribing the manner by which the
court determines the amount of remittitur.""1 6 If the plaintiff decides
to remit, which will depend upon the amount to be remitted and the
strengths of the defendant's case, the defendant's motion for a new trial
will be overruled. In the event the defendant appeals the judgment,
the plaintiff will "not be barred from contending in the appellate court
that said remittitur should not have been required either in whole
or in part .... "117 If, on appeal, the trial court's order of remittitur is
found to be erroneous, the court of civil appeals "should restore the
remittitur or such part thereof as the court of civil appeals deems
necessary to prevent the order from being manifestly unjust and render
such judgment as the trial court should have rendered." 118
At the Appellate Level
Remittiturs do not have as much to offer, tactically speaking, at the
trial level as at the appellate level. Once a case has been appealed to
the court of civil appeals, the attorney has two alternatives: (1) He
may remit what might be considered the excessive amount before the
judgment of the court of civil appeals is rendered; 19 or (2) he may
114 Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Farnsworth, 148 Tex. 584, 592, 227 S.W.2d 1017, 1022
(1950); see TEx. R. Civ. P. 440. ". . . if such court is of the opinion that the verdict and
judgment of the trial court is excessive and that said cause should be reversed for that
reason only ....

"

Some early cases allowed remittiturs only when the verdict had been influenced by a
jury's passion or prejudice. See Staine, Remittitur in Texas, 29 TEXAS L. REv. 347 (1951).
However, the Texas Supreme Court has denounced this obstacle. Dallas Ry. & Terminal
Co. v. Farnsworth, 148 Tex. 584, 592, 227 S.W.2d 1017, 1022 (1950). "[T]here need not be
extraneous proof of passion or prejudice or any other proof showing that the jury was
'improperly motivated.'" Flanigan v. Carswell, 159 Tex. 598, 607, 324 S.W.2d 835, 841
(1959).
115 Flanigan v. Carswell, 159 Tex. 598, 604, 324 S.W.2d 835, 839 (1959); see TEx. R. Civ.
P. 328.
116 Adams v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 158 Tex. 551, 558, 314 S.W.2d 826, 830
(1958).
117 TEx. R. Civ. P. 328.
118 Flanigan v. Carswell, 159 Tex. 598, 606, 324 S.W.2d 835, 841 (1959); see TEx. R. Civ.
P. 328.
119 TEx. R. Cxv. P. 439:
If . . . such judgment shall be removed to the Court of Civil Appeals, it shall be
lawful for the party . . . to make such remittitur in the Court of Civil Appeals in
the same manner as such release is required to be made in the district or county
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await the judgment of the court of civil appeals, which will affirm,
conditionally reverse with the suggestion of remittitur, x20 or reverse
without the suggestion of remittitur. A reversal solely because a judgment is excessive, without a suggestion of remittitur, can nevertheless
2
lead to a remittitur,1 1
Courts of civil appeals are governed by the same standards as trial
122
courts in the determination of whether a judgment is excessive.
Although there are no precise rules prescribing the manner by which
a court determines the amount of remittitur, 123 the supreme court has
set guidelines in this area.
All the Court of Civil Appeals can do, and all that is required of
it to do... is to exercise its sound judicial judgment and discretion in the ascertainment of what amount would be reasonable
compensation ...

and treat the balance as excess. The court must

first determine what amount would be reasonable before it can
determine what amount would be unreasonable .

. .

. Having

determined that the verdict is excessive, or unreasonable, it is
necessarily implied that the court has decided upon an amount
that would be reasonable compensation . . . in which event it

should authorize a remittitur of the excess above the amount
which would be reasonable
compensation ...
124

its sound judgment.

in accordance with

Rule 440125 has been held by the supreme court to impose "a mandatory duty upon the court of civil appeals.' 26 It follows that when a
court of civil appeals reverses an award of attorney fees solely because
they are unreasonable, or excessive, the court is obligated to permit a
remittitur of the excess and affirm, as reformed. 127 This aspect of remitcourt. Upon such release being filed in said court, after revising said judgment, said
Court of Civil Appeals shall proceed to give such judgment as the court below
ought to have given if the release had been filed therein.
120 Tax. R. Civ. P. 440.
121 See TRx. R. Civ. P. 440; Dye v. Western Fire & Indem. Co., 426 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.
Sup. 1968); Carter v. Texarkana Bus Co., 156 Tex. 285, 295 S.W.2d 653 (1956).
122 E.g., Flanigan v. Carswell, 159 Tex. 598, 606, 324 S.W.2d 835, 840 (1959); World Oil
Co. v. Hicks, 129 Tex. 297, 301, 103 S.W.2d 962, 964 (1937).
123 Adams v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 158 Tex. 551, 558, 314 S.W.2d 826, 830
(1958).
124 Wilson v. Freeman, 108 Tex. 121, 125, 185 S.W. 993, 994 (1916); the same language
was quoted with approval in Flanigan v. Carswell, 159 Tex. 598, 606, 324 S.W.2d 835, 840
(1959).
125 TEX. R. Civ. P. 440.

.126 Carter v. Texarkana Bus Co., 156 Tex. 285, 286, 295 S.W.2d 653, 653 (1956).
127 See Dye v. Western Fire & Indem. Co., 426 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Sup. 1968); Flanigan v.
Carswell, 159 Tex. 598, 606, 324 S.W.2d 835, 841 (1959); Adams v. Houston Lighting &
Power Co., 158 Tex. 551, 558, 314 S.W.2d 826, 830 (1958); Carter v. Texarkana Bus Co.,
156 Tex. 285, 295 S.W.2d 653 (1956); Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Farnsworth, 148 Tex.

584, 592, 227 S.W.2d 1017, 1022 (1950).
It is important to keep in mind the distinction between "no evidence" cases and "insufficient evidence" cases. When speaking of remittiturs we must be dealing with "insuffi.
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titurs should become increasingly valuable in attorney fee litigation
dealing with amended article 2226. Cases will arise where a trial court
has awarded a fee in excess of the minimum fee schedule. 128 In the
event the appellate court finds the fee to be unreasonable, 1 29 a remittitur based upon the prima facie evidence of the minimum fee schedule
may be uniformly and efficiently applied.
CONCLUSION

Further judicial interpretation is foreseen before article 2226 settles
into a readily workable statute. The intent of the amendment seems
to be aimed at minimizing the proof requirements for reasonableness.
Yet, Duncan, McDonald, and Superior Stationers exemplify the gamut
of possible interpretations of the proof requirements under this statute.
The Duncan and SuperiorStationers interpretations impede the amendment's intent to establish a constant base for reasonableness; the
amount prescribed by the minimum fee schedule. Before the amendment, there was no amount prescribed as reasonable and each case had
to establish reasonableness starting from zero. The amendment merely
establishes the amount prescribed by the minimum fee schedule as
the starting point for the proof of reasonableness. This intent to remove
some of the unnecessary requirements for proving reasonableness would
be breached by courts' imposition of new requirements based upon a
restrictive interpretation. Hopefully, the Texas Supreme Court will
interpret the amendment in a manner which will not defeat the intent
to relax the proof requirements of reasonableness.
cient evidence" cases. In "no evidence" cases excessiveness is not the issue, which precludes
a remittitur.
128 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1972).
129 In cases where the judge has taken judicial knowledge of the minimum fee schedule
and the case file there should be no question as to these being "insufficient evidence"
cases, instead of "no evidence" cases.
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